The Chickamauga map, as you see it, is the product of an analysis of several contradictory cartographic sources. While everyone can agree on the location of Chickamauga Creek, Lafayette Road, Rossville Gap, etc., the location of other roads, woods, rough terrain, etc., particularly in areas of this map which were not historically fought over, represents the designer's deductions. When in doubt as to the nature of a hex it became woods, since all written descriptions of the battlefield picture it as a tree-to-tree fight, rivaled only by the Wilderness for its closeness.
The artillery units represented on each side are abstract units. Most of the artillery strength of each side has been factored into the respective infantry units, which is somewhat realistic, since artillery at Chickamauga fought in dispersed batteries due to the broken nature of the terrain. This illustrates a simple, but effective design technique to keep rules to a minimum; using the counter mix to influence play. It isn't necessary to have detailed and complex rules governing artillery's use and movement in order to restrict its use to a historically accurate and realistic level.
Unlike many games, Chickamauga lends itself to an historical treatment of Victory Conditions, to determine which Player wins. That is, the game is a naturally balanced game if we simply adopt historical victory conditions. Of course, we have to decide what constituted victory. This leads us to an analysis of the campaign that led up to the battle, the battle itself and its consequences. Briefly summarized, it is as follows:
In the middle of August, l863, the Union Army of the Ohio, under Rosecrans, crossed the Tennessee River southwest of Chattanooga, fanned out into three corps columns, and drove east through a succession of mountain ridgelines in an enveloping maneuver which so threatened the communications of the Confederate Army under Bragg, massed around Chattanooga, that Bragg felt compelled to abandon Chattanooga and fall back toward Atlanta. The Confederates reinforced Bragg with Longstreet's Corps, sent in by rail from Virginia. And Bragg advanced to meet and crush the still strung-out and separated Union Corps. After frittering away several days, during which he could have easily destroyed the Union Army in detail, Bragg finally threw the mass of his army into contact with the partially concentrated Union Army at Chickamauga Creek on the evening of September 18th. The main battle started early on the 19th of September, with Rosecrans fighting desperately to contain the Confederate Army and gain time for his 20th Corps to arrive. The Confederates mounted a series of uncoordinated attacks, which served to pin the Union Army on the field, but failed to either prevent the arrival of the 20th Corps or to seize the approaches to the gaps through Missionary Ridge. On the whole, the results of the 19th were favorable to Rosecrans and he decided to stand and offer battle on the following day rather than risk a night withdrawal through the mountain passes. He also though he had a good chance of holding the Confederates on the following day and smashing them in turn with a counter-attack when they were repulsed. The 20th began with the Confederates attacking in echelon from north to south. The Union northern wing held and Rosecrans looked like a winner until, through oversight, he weakened his center at the very moment that Longstreet's entire Corps attacked it. The Union southern flank dissolved and retreated in disorder up the Dry Valley Road, through Rossville and McFarland's Gaps, carrying Rosecrans with them in flight. Thomas, in command of the remaining Union forces, bent the intact northern wing around to hold Snodgrass hill and proceeded to stand off the entire Confederate Army with the help of the Union Reserve Corps, which came down from guarding Rossville, and the tactical ineptitude of Bragg, who could not get his army to make a general attack. When night fell, Thomas was able to get through the gaps to Chattanooga. Bragg followed the next day with a cautious advance allowing the Union Army to recover sufficiently to man the defenses of Chattanooga. Bragg contented himself with investing Chattanooga, fortifying the dominating heights of Missionary Ridge and Lookout Mountain, thus isolating the Union Army.
In terms of casualties [killed, wounded and missing] the battle was about even; the Confederates lost approximately 18,000 out if some 66,000 and the Union about 15,000 out of 60,000 participating. This doesn't reflect that fact that half of the surviving Union units were disorganized and effectively out of action immediately following the battle. [In game terms, they could be considered eliminated.]
Historically, the South won the battle, smashing the Army of the Ohio as an offensive threat and penning it up in Chattanooga. But it wasn't a decisive win; that would have required destroying the army outright, and recapturing Chattanooga, with consequent distortion of the whole course of the war in l864. And what's more, except for a lucky break, Bragg could have dashed his army against the Union positions, failed to weaken it sufficiently and been forced to retreat on Atlanta. It was a near run thing. Thus, we felt the matter of Player victory depended on Strength Point elimination, the possession of important geographical objectives, and the possibility of one Player or the other moving a significant force of his army into Chattanooga, while denying it to his opponent.
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