Designer's Notes

When Napoleon crossed into Russia in Russia in June, 1812, he had mobilized 650,000 men who eventually were to enter the country. The Russians had 175000 men divided into two armies under Barclay de Tolly and Bagration on the border. These were the largest forces ever assembled in modern times up to that point to engage in war, Napoleon drove a wedge between the two armies, and they rapidly retreated in attempts to regain contact with each other. All through July and August, the Russians fell back, with the French desperately force marching in attempts to destroy one or the other armies. The Russians also began transferring troops from other theaters, and training new ones; this eventually gained them some 350,000 additional men. Finally the Russians reunited near Smolensk, and after a sharp fight there, and a further retreat, turned and stood under the recalled General Kutusoy, only eighty miles from Moscow, the ancient capital.

The position was nearly perfect from a defensive view point. The left was covered by the steep banked Kalotchka river, while the right was lightly wooded in a fashion to channel all attacks. The north of the battlefield was rendered secure by the steeply banked Moskva river; the south was protected by thick woods. However, the Russians had a number of problems. For unknown reasons, Kutusov believed that the French would attack along the virtually impassable Kalothchka instead of along the two roads of advance leading onto the nap. Thus he dangerously weakened his left flank to reinforce his right. Even after the French came onto the battlefield, he persisted in retaining the forces there. Another problem was the overly complex command structure. Corps wore lumped together under a command, some commands were lumped together into a section of the front and some were not), while the two army Headquarters were retained as well as an overall command post for Kutusov. Thus a major decision might have to be carried through four levels of command above the division.

The French had their own problems. Since crossing into Russia, the units that fought at Borodino had lost 55 percent of all cavalry, 45 percent of all infantry and 5 percent of all guns from the original forces. Still Napoleon assembled 100000 infantry, 30,000 cavalry and 587 guns to face the Russians 83,000 regular infantry, 10,000 Moscow militia, 20,000 regular cavalry, 7,000 Cossacks and 640 guns. In trained manpower, Napoleon had an overall' advantage of 25%. He needed a victory and very badly; his only reason for not stopping at Smolensk and wintering there was his fears concerning France and/or Europe rising against him while trapped deep in Russia. Additionally, Napoleon had never returned from a particular campaigning season with out a major victory. To survive was not enough; he required a quick knock-out blow to end the war. He thought occupation Moscow would give him that victory.

The battle was clumsy and followed a late-life trend of Napoleon's to avoid fancy tactical maneuvers in favor of crushing blows, even these were more expensive in casualties. Turning aside an suggestion of maneuvering, he merely observed the Russians on September 6th, which was probably the best time to defeat the Russians, since their left flank was virtually wide open. Instead he launched clumsy massive assaults against the Russians on September 7th. These were slaughtered. Still he threw more and more troops against the Redoubts, taking them several times, but always losing them again. Finally the Russians were permanently forced out of their position about 1600, despite their attempt at an outflanking movement to the West of the Kaloctchka river. Both sides were too exhausted to pursue the matter further, and the Russians retreats the following day without a French pursuit.

At first appearances, Napoleon may have thought that this was the victory he wanted. After all, although French losses had been 30,000-35,000 men, the Russians probably had been in excess of 40,000 men. Also, he gained Moscow. But the Russians hung on, and gradually Napoleon realized that he had not crushed the Russians; he had merely pushed them back. Borodino was his last chance to control Europe. After that, because of his own inabilities, and the mood of Europe, he slid inexorably to Waterloo.