Decision making is simply finding the answers to a series of yes/no questions all simple by themselves, whose interrelationships become more and more complex as the list of questions grows. This, in a nutshell is a conflict simulation: a series of mutually supporting interrelated decisions.
The final factor in the process is this: It is important that the simulation of an event take a relatively limited point of view in its interpretation of that event. A game which presents more than a few interrelating points of view is a very complex game. In designing a campaign game we first tried to gain an all important understanding of the terrain as the battles and battlefields were studied individually. Then one major point of view was chosen - the Command and Command Structures as well as the relative competence of the individuals in these structures had enormous impact on the conduct of the 1815 campaign. These rules developed out of a perception of how those leaders operated (and failed). The rules are imparted here to give the effect of this command structure on the campaign.
To begin with, how much 'design' did we actually start with when the 'Waterloo Campaign' was first proposed - it seems surprising -a full year ago? Actually, not much more than the notion that four maps could be contrived to fit together, this much was sketched out beforehand. And in fact, the game only seduced its designer after preliminary work on the actual terrain plan, which was troublesome. The basic source for the road net was the West Point Atlas of Napoleonic Wars, but for other features we used a period map.
At this point we first discovered the flaws of the game-maps used in earlier simulations of the campaign. In fact, there was a tradition of misinformation, particularly the wholly imaginary 'hill' at Quatre Bras, which was passed down from AH to GDW. A third, topographical source revealed only the slightest of crests south of the town with a rise of about 10 meters between the initial French and Netherlands positions. The game's impetuous developer continually revised the terrain features to bring them into line with each new account of the battle, and confirmed them with fresh assaults against the New York Public Library's map division, armed only with a see-through hex grid overlay and the latest prototype game map.
While the map was in its first evolution, an order of battle for the folios was begun. While this, on a brigade level, is probably the most easily accessible OB of any historical period, the actual order of appearance and the precise location of units at given times is subject to controversy. This listing finally became so unwieldy that a Unit Manifest was devised, which listed each unit only once, but showed its location on each day and its time of arrival in the area. This, in turn, sparked the notion of standardized reduced strengths on the reverse side of each unit, while simultaneously it became apparent that these units could not sustain 50% losses in battle and remain coherent: such losses would give the survivors good cause to scatter to the winds, while a good number of troops would rally to a less badly-mauled brigade.
This rationale also explains the rather bloody looking CRT used, with little modification, since the dawn of the Napoleon at Waterloo system; the loss of tactical unit effectiveness, as measured in temporary unit elimination, is not a measure of casualties per se but a measure of unit cohesion. Thus units which have previously taken losses become more 'brittle'; their inability to reorganize after any further beating is an even more serious matter than the fact of their reduced strength. The rough handling that the Prussian First Corps' advanced guard received near Charleroi on the 15th June places these units in a precarious position from the start of the game. (As a footnote, it would be impossible for the French Player to reorganize the units of the 7th Division if lost on the 16th June - because of the proximity of their corps officer - and, even so, in the actual campaign what remained of these units stayed at the Ligny battlefield, and failed to show up to provide a planned rearguard at Quatre Bras after the events of 18th June.)
Napoleon could have been ensured of victory in the campaign if he had inflicted a decisive defeat on the Prussian army on the 16th. With Blucher obliged, even against his nature, to withdraw upon his lines of communications about Liege, Wellington's defeat by the greater part of the French army would have been no longer in doubt. Yet such an ignominious Prussian act would never come about in a game; and we could hardly award victory to an independent Prussian Player over the French and British Players for so doing, for his army would have been next destroyed after Wellington's. With a three-player game thus ruled out, means had to be found to keep the entirely separate, if not secretly hostile, Prussian and Anglo-Allied armies from cooperating as a single player would have them do. Thus came about the rules concerning communications. Wellington was even more prone to fall back upon his communications than was Blucher and, on the 15th, had actually ordered his army's concentration toward them, away from Napoleon's intended goal and the all-important support of the Prussians. An eye had always to be kept toward the maintenance of communications upon separate bases, by both Wellington and Blucher, until the firm commitment by the other could be insured; and any sort of concentration toward the inner flank had to be delayed until the decisive battle against Napoleon. Thus, even at Waterloo, Blucher held back his forces until Wellington's intentions could be seen.
The tactical situations presented in the four battles of the set include all types of Napoleonic era action: From the set piece assault of Ligny, to the wildly variable Quatre Bras, to the monumental action at La Belle Alliance, to the double delaying action at Wavre, all games present the Player with a challenging situation. It is recommended that players utilize the Combined Arms and Imperial Guard special rule to show the rather important and interesting interaction of the tactical arms of these forces. What about the Crest hexsides? It is just possible (although arguably) that Wellington's use of reverse slope tactics against Napoleon and his Generals just about outmoded Napoleon's artillery-based type of warfare. At Ligny, for example, Blucher insisted, against Wellington's advice, on deploying on the forward slopes of the surrounding hills, virtually assuring the destruction of Blucher's three Corps at Ligny. On the other hand Wellington, deploying his small, but well disciplined force on the reverse of a low ridge, stopped Napoleon for nearly six hours until the arrival of Blucher's Prussians sealed Napoleon's fate.
As in the design of a game the play of a game concerns itself with a series of decisions. In a tactical sense there are always a seeming myriad in every game; whether or not to advance, how to allocate these Combat Strength Points (ad infinitum). In a strategic sense (when there is one) these decisions are usually fewer in number and considerably more subtle. The Player who is rewarded by his strategy is the Player who makes one or two basic decisions: takes a limited point of view as to the problems involved. Then analyzes them correctly and acts on them quickly and efficiently with a minimum of haste and plenty of room for mistakes and 'bad luck'. Don't be too fancy: You may find yourself with your back to a locked door.
As a final word, the concomitant development of Wellington's Victory and the discussion and examination of the campaign that resulted was extremely valuable for all involved.
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