The war in the east (1941-45) between Russian and Germany was decided, to a large extent, by two major battles. The first was the Battle of Stalingrad (September 1942-February 1943). and the subsequent Russian offensive. This offensive set the stage for the Battle of Kursk in mid-1943.
At the Battle of Stalingrad the German army had been smashed like never before. Of the divisions surrounded at Stalingrad (21 in all) six were motorized, three of these being panzer divisions. At that time there were only 31 German motorized divisions in Russia. Twenty percent of them were neutralized at Stalingrad. Although the 21 Stalingrad divisions were a bit less than 10% of the 234 divisions of the Germans had on the eastern front, another 14 `allied` (Rumanian and Italian) divisions were destroyed outright during the Russian offensive. After the Winter battles of 1942/43 were over the Germans had lost 37 of the `allied` divisions they had in November 1942. In effect, the Germans lost 56 divisions during the Stalingrad campaign, 24% of their division strength in Russia. By the Spring of 1943 they had replaced about half of these, although the loss in motorized divisions was never really made good, Infantry divisions were much easier to replace.
In many ways the German army of 1943 was of better quality than that of early 1942. For one thing, it relied much less on Hungarian. Rumanian and Italian `allied` divisions. On the other hand, the divisions themselves were weaker. In June 1942 180 German divisions contained 3.1 million men. In mid '43 190 divisions contained only 3 million. Worse yet, the available pool of replacements had been stripped, in order to bring the German divisions up to strength. Finally, there was the strength of the Russian army, against which German strength must be measured. In mid1942 it stood at about 4 million, much of it still undergoing training. In mid 1943 Russian army strength stood at 5,5 million. Most of these men were now trained, and many were veterans of the recent Stalingrad battle.
The German's superior training enabled them to halt the Russians during the winter battles of early 1943. The Spring thaw set in in March and by late April was almost over. During this `mud` period neither side could do much of anything, except rebuild their shattered units. This the Germans did, and because of their still superior training and organization, they were able to do it faster than the Russians. Some German commanders urged that any attacks to be made be made immediately, in May, or June at the latest. But the German high command was not as confident as it was a year ago. The Russians had proven quite capable of defeating German armies. In 1942 such a defeat could be made good. This was not so in 1943.
Allied armies were on the verge of defeating the quarter million man Nazi (mainly Italian) army in North Africa. Closely following this would be an invasion of Sicily or the European mainland. The Germans were, so to speak, concerned about all of this. The events in North Africa had a profound effect on the situation in central Russia.
The basic German strategy in Russia for 1943 was to try and keep the Russians off balance, to `bleed` them with limited offensives and rapid counterattacks against Russian thrusts. Out of this `basic` strategy came the Battle of Kursk (`Operation Zitadelle`).
The playing-map for the KURSK game shows about 40% of the Russian front. The map covers about 440 miles of front from north to south. Above the map it is about 500 miles to Leningrad, south of the map it is about 160 miles to the Black Sea. Russian and German strength was distributed as follows (July, 1943):
On playing-map-German: 84 divisions (18 panzer. 4 motorized infantry, 5 foreign, 5 security and 52 infantry, of which two were but remnants attached to other divisions). Russian, 193 divisions (160 infantry, 25 mobile - 18 tank corps and 7 mechanized - and 8 cavalry).
North of the. playing map: German: 76 divisions (2 motorized infantry, 5 security and 60 infantry). Russian: 158 divisions (4 mobile, 4 cavalry and 150 infantry).
South of the playing map: German: 45 divisions (2 panzer, 1 motorized infantry, 9 foreign, five security and 28 infantry). Russian: 100 divisions (90 infantry, 6 mobile and 4 cavalry). The number of divisions given for the Russians is approximate because of the manner in which the Russians deployed reserves. They frequently switched these large masses of divisions during operations. In effect, these large bodies of men belonged to no one sector of the front.
From the above you can see what a tremendous chance the Germans were taking in concentrating most of their mobile units 22 out of 27 divisions) for the attempt to pinch off the Kursk salient. Unknown to them was another major advantage for the Russians, a spy within the German high command. This gave the Russians precise information on where the Germans would attack, what with and when. This proved to be a critical advantage. They knew the Kursk area was to be the target. Therefore the Russians concentrated all of their efforts on this area. Instead of just one defensive line, the Russians had time to build three. More important, German delays in launching the offensive allowed the Russians to bring their combat units up to full strength. This can be seen in the game scenarios given. Below is a description of each of the game situations, plus some general pointers on tactics to use in the game.
Only one active defense line and a 2-1 German armor superiority makes this a very difficult Russian situation at first sight, but it is not. The German armor is numerous, but still weak from the winter fighting. The Soviets simply place their 3-5 units on the north and south faces of the salient and their armor in front of Orel and Kharkov. The German set up gives them the option to pinch the salient or drive east into the endless steppe.
Probable Outcome: German marginal victory, little chance of taking Kursk, rather their best chance is to drive east and then roll up the Soviet flank.
The Germans are about as strong in this one as they are going to get. Same German set-up as in previous scenario, only stronger. Armor should not be placed in the front line in initial set-up but held back a few hexes so as to. threaten as much of the Russian front as possible. This makes the Russians somewhat weaker as they must deploy in strength along a wider front. This is the only scenario where the Germans should be able to take Kursk. The Russian army is simply outclassed,
Probable Outcome: German decisive victory. If the Russians place their mobile troops in the salient then the sides collapse:
Forget Kursk. Triple defense lines and Russian armor superiority are the main features of this scenario. The Germans must engage Soviet armor and defeat it. A smart Russian player can prevent this. But as is true with the two previous scenarios, the Russian will probably lose a lot of infantry.
Probable Outcome: Russian marginal victory, The German Order of Battle is impressive, but the Russian's is overwhelming,
This description applies both for the Russian offensive using the original German set up (as shown on the map) and the scenario, assuming that the Germans do not attack but go over to the defensive. The original Russian Summer Offensive (as shown on the set-up map) is the legendary Russian steamroller in action. The following comments apply to the scenario with a full strength German army on the defensive. You can easily see how much worse off the Germans are in the historical set up.
This is probably the most interesting scenario (Germans assume the defensive) as it is the most challenging. The games played usually come out with the Germans being pushed (or chased, depending on how good the German player is) back to the Hagen line in the north while trying to stop the Russians in front of, inside of or behind Kharkov. The Germans must carefully extricate the bulk of their infantry to positions in the Hagen line. This is very difficult and you will probably win or lose the game doing this. The south is more straightforward. The Russian player usually falls just short of Kharkov, unless the German is incompetent. Initial deployment of Russian infantry, particularly the guards units, is absolutely critical.
Probable Outcome: German marginal, but this scenario is very delicate and a few errors can cause tremendous variations.
This scenario should come out quite similar to anything you can come up with deploying as you like. It shows that the Germans had a somewhat more loose attitude than most game players. (Or else it shows that the game is pretty accurate!
Dispersion: The Germans must divide their armor almost equally on the north and south sides of the salient. This will force the Russians to do the same with their forces, If the Nazis concentrate they will have no success whatsoever.
Attacking: Since the German usually finds himself attacking masses of Russian infantry in all games he must avoid exchanges unless he has infantry to cover losses, Ideally, don't attack with pore armor at less than 9-1 with air support.
Retreating: German Units must make sure that they will be able to retreat in case of successful counterattacks. So don't concentrate too much behind deep penetrations.
Depth: Anywhere German armor units threaten, try to have a defense in depth to preclude deep penetrations.
Committing Armor: Kursk is a short game (6 turns), German and Russian armor must be committed immediately. Study carefully and then make your move, You only have one chance and you can't mess around,
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